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Abstract Although industrialized nations have long pro-
vided public protection to working-age individuals with dis-
abilities, the form has changed over time. The impetus for
change has been multi-faceted: rapid growth in program
costs; greater awareness that people with impairments are
able and willing to work; and increased recognition that
protecting the economic security of people with disabilities
might best be done by keeping them in the labor market.
Here we describe the evolution of disability programs in
four countries: Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the
United States. We show how growth in the receipt of pub-
lically provided disability benefits has fluctuated over time
and discuss how policy choices played a role. Based on our
descriptive comparative analysis we summarize shared ex-
periences that potentially benefit policymakers in all coun-
tries.
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Absicherung von Personen mit
Erwerbsminderung: Erfahrungen aus vier
Industrieländern
Zusammenfassung Zwar gibt es in den meisten Indus-
trieländern seit langem staatliche Programme, die die Ein-
kommensverluste von Beschäftigten nach Eintreten einer
Erwerbsminderung ersetzen sollen, doch der Umfang sol-
cher Programme hat sich mit der Zeit verändert. Die Ände-
rungen ergaben sich aus einer Vielzahl von Faktoren, unter
anderem einem rapiden Anstieg der Kosten, einem größe-
ren Bewusstsein dafür, dass Menschen mit gesundheitlichen
Einschränkungen in der Lage und willens sind zu arbeiten,
sowie aus der Erkenntnis, dass die wirtschaftliche Absiche-
rung von Menschen mit Behinderungen am besten dadurch
zu erreichen ist, dass sie im Arbeitsmarkt verbleiben. Die-
ser Artikel beschreibt die Entwicklung der Sozialversiche-
rungssysteme zur Erwerbsminderungsrente in vier Ländern
(Deutschland, Niederlande, Schweden und USA) seit 1970.
Wir untersuchen Trends in Bezug auf den Anteil an Er-
werbsminderungsrentnern in den einzelnen Ländern (An-
teil an Erwerbsminderungsrentnern pro 100 Personen im
erwerbsfähigen Alter) sowie die Rolle, die die Politik bei
der Ausprägung dieser Trends spielte. Unsere deskriptive
komparative Länderanalyse fasst Gemeinsamkeiten in allen
vier Industrienationen zusammen und fokussiert sich darü-
ber hinausgehend auf das deutsche System der Erwerbs-
minderungsrente (vormals Erwerbsunfähigkeitsrente).
1 Introduction
All industrialized nations provide some form of public pro-
tection to working-age individuals with disabilities. In their
early manifestations, these programs focused on easing the
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Fig. 1 Trends in Disability
Beneficairies per 100 Work-
ing Age Population. (Source:
Deutsche Rentenversicherung
(2014a), Statistisches Bunde-
samt (2014), Social Security
Administration, US Census
Bureau; Statisitics Sweden
and Swedish Social Insurance
Agency yearbooks, Statistics
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financial consequences of disability by providing cash as-
sistance in lieu of full-time work. Over time a number of
nations have moved away from simple cash assistance to
emphasize pro-work programs designed to help individuals
with disabilities maintain their labor market connections.
On balance these changes have reflected concerns about
rapid growth in program rolls as well as increased aware-
ness that many individuals with disabilities can remain pro-
ductively in the labor market.
In this paper, we describe the evolution of disability pro-
grams in four countries: Germany, the Netherlands, Swe-
den, and the United States. We select these countries as
examples of nations with similar goals but very different ap-
proaches to achieving them. We begin by comparing trends
in disability recipiency across countries. We find that all
four countries experienced pronounced fluctuations in dis-
ability recipiency rates over the past 40 years. We show
that these fluctuations are difficult to explain based on the
relatively stable paths of variables such as health and pop-
ulation composition. We go on to describe changes in dis-
ability policy in each country and show that these changes
are well correlated with the ups and downs in country dis-
ability recipiency rates. We interpret these correlations as
suggestive of a link between policy and disability recip-
iency and summarize shared lessons that can be gleaned
from the experiences in each nation. Although our paper is
simply a descriptive comparative analysis, it highlights the
similarities of experiences across nations and underscores
the potential benefit of learning from other countries’ pol-
icy reform efforts when tackling the challenges associated
with providing social protection to those with disabilities.
2 Disability program growth across countries
The number of workers receiving disability-based social
insurance has increased substantially in most industrialized
nations over the past forty years. Population growth ac-
counts for part of this increase, but disability caseloads as
a share of the working age population age – known as the
disability recipiency rate – also have risen substantially.1
This can be seen in Fig. 1, which shows the total number
of persons receiving long-term categorical disability income
benefits as a share of the working-age population in our four
countries.2 This is the most critical number to policymak-
ers since it measures the magnitude of the fiscal burden
that these disability programs place on country finances.
We show values beginning in 1970 through the last year of
1 Pattison and Waldron (2013) argue that population growth explains
the bulk of the rise in disability recipiency (the Disability Insur-
ance (DI) program) in the U.S. Duggan and Imbermans (2009) and
Burkhauser et al. (2014) remove the influence of population growth
and consider the factors that explain the remaining rise in the program.
Since population growth alone would not put additional financial pres-
sure on the system, knowing what these other factors are is critical to
policymakers tasked with funding the system. Most recently Liebman
(2015) argues that most of the increase in the DI incidence rate, con-
trolling for other factors including unemployment rates, occurred in
the 1980s. Since then this controlled measure of incidence has leveled
off, but at a substantially higher rate than in the early 1970s.
2 The U.S. disability recipiency rate only includes beneficiaries re-
ceiving Social Security Disability Insurance (DI). When SSI-disabled
adults and DI program beneficiaries are combined, the level of the
U.S. disability recipiency rate is higher, but the patterns over time
are roughly the same. This point is demonstrated in Burkhauser et al.
(2013), Fig. 2.
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Table 1 Growth rate of DI recipiency rate per 100 working
population over time (geometric averages)
Netherlands Sweden United States Germany
1970–1979 11.15 5.46 5.57 1.47
1980–1989 1.78 1.58 –0.95 –0.75
1990–1999 –0.37 1.41 4.09 –2.70
2000–Final –1.28 0.91 3.61 –1.58
1970–Final 2.50 2.25 2.99 –0.96
public data in each country.3 We provide a more detailed
description of the data in Appendix A (Table 3).
Fig. 1 plots the disability recipiency rate (disability bene-
ficiaries as a share of the working-age population) over time
for each country. In 1970, disability recipiency rates in our
three EU nations were considerably higher: 4.2 % in Ger-
many, 2.4 % in the Netherlands and 3.5 % in Sweden, than
they were in the U.S. (1.2 %). Since then disability recipi-
ency rates have risen substantially in each country with the
exception of Germany. However, as the figure highlights,
they have done so along significantly different trajectories.
To see these dynamics more clearly, Table 1 provides
average annual growth rates (geometric averages) in dis-
ability recipiency by decade and over the entire sample. As
the table shows, disability recipiency rates rose in all coun-
tries during the 1970s, with especially rapid growth in the
Netherlands and more modest growth in Germany. In con-
trast, in the 1980s, recipiency rates grew more modestly and
even fell in the U.S. and Germany. By the 1990s, growth
in the Netherlands and Germany ended and disability re-
cipiency rates, on balance, fell over the decade. During the
2000s, disability recipiency rates continued to fall in the
Netherlands and Germany and grew less quickly in Swe-
den. Growth in the U.S. slowed slightly but remained quite
high relative to the EU countries in our sample.
The final average (1970-final) shows that smoothing
through the fluctuations in growth that have occurred over
the decades, the U.S. experienced the highest average an-
nual growth rate over the sample period. The rapid growth
in our three EU countries brought on program reforms and
a tempering or reversal of the path of disability recipiency.
In contrast, with the exception of the 1980s, growth in U.S.
disability recipiency has been nearly continuous over the
sample period.
Of course one possible explanation for the differences
in growth across countries is that health and population
characteristics have evolved differently for each nation over
time. To understand the extent to which these factors might
account for the growth in disability recipiency shown in
3 Disability caseloads data are made public with a considerable lag
in some countries. Hence we cannot fully document how the Global
Financial Crisis affected recipiency rates in all countries.
Fig. 1 and Table 1, we compare trends in self-reported
health across countries and more formally evaluate the role
that demographics and other changes in the population el-
igible for disability benefits might account for trends in
disability recipiency rates. We begin by examining trends
in self-reported health over time and across countries. Al-
though prone to response biases, which are well docu-
mented in the literature, the strength of the self-reported
health measure is its availability across countries and over
time.4 McGee et al. (1999) show that self-reported health
is highly correlated with objective health measures and is a
very reliable indicator of mortality.
Fig. 2 contains OECD data on self-reported health status
for each of our countries. The plot shows the percentage
of the population aged 45–64 in each country reporting
that they are in very good or good health on a survey that
asks respondents to state whether they are in very good,
good, fair, or poor health.5 Since the incidence of disability
increases with age, this is the most relevant age group for
examining the role of health in disability benefit trends.
Although there are persistent differences across coun-
tries in the percent of individuals reporting very good or
good health, there is little variation over time within coun-
tries. Over the past ten years the overall prevalence of very
good or good health among working-age populations has
remained relatively steady in each country. The relative
stability of the health measure in each of our sample coun-
tries suggests that changes in the prevalence of impairments
in the working-age population is unlikely to account for the
bulk of the within and across country fluctuations in disabil-
ity recipiency rates found in Fig. 1 and Table 1. Findings
reported in Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2012) come to the
same conclusions.
A second reason disability recipiency rates may have var-
ied across countries over time is that the eligible populations
in those nations may have evolved differently. Examples
of this include increased labor force participation among
women in the U.S., which increased the share of women el-
igible for Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) benefits.
However, previous research has found that accounting for
these factors cannot fully explain the differences in levels
and trends across countries. See: for example Burkhauser
et al. (2014) and OECD (2010).
4 Some of the differences across countries may relate to the age struc-
ture of the population. Older populations report lower rates of good
health than younger populations. Remaining differences likely owe to
reporting differences that are idiosyncratic to each country (e. g. Jürges
2007, Ziebarth, 2010a; Van Soest et al, 2011).
5 Unfortunately, for the years considered since the 1980s, the OECD
Health Statistics only includes the population shares in good or very
good health, not those in fair or poor health. We take the stability
of these shares as indirect evidence that the population shares in bad
health have remained stable as well.
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Fig. 2 Trends in Self-Reported
Health Across Countries, Age
45–64. (Source: Organization
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If neither health nor population characteristics can ac-
count for all of the cross-country differences in disability
recipiency rates, either levels or trends, then what does?
An obvious possibility is policy.6 In what follows we show
how changes in disability policy and its implementation in
each country are correlated with the dynamics of disabil-
ity recipiency rates we documented in Fig. 1. While our
comparative descriptive analysis falls short of establishing
a causal effect of policy on the disability rolls, it is sugges-
tive of the potential impact of policy design on the trends
in disability benefit receipt across and within the countries
in our sample.
3 Disability policy and program growth
In industrialized nations, social protection from income loss
associated with disability is just one part of a broader so-
cial safety net designed to protect working age individuals
from the loss of labor market income. Countries also pro-
vide protection to those who lose market income for other
reasons such as unemployment or old age.
6 We are not the first to make this point. The OECD (2010) sum-
mary of disability program growth across OECD nations concludes
that policy rather than population characteristics are behind the rapid
expansion of disability benefit receipt in most nations. The point is
also emphasized by Autor and Duggan (2010) and Burkhauser and
Daly (2011, 2012) for the U.S., Staubli (2011) and Mullen and Staubli
(2016) for Austria, and Burkhauser et al. (2014) cross-nationally. Lieb-
man (2015) acknowledges that policy can matter but argues this is less
the case for the U.S. since the 1990s.
In general, countries provide this protection in tiers as-
sociated with the expectations of employment for different
groups. The first tier provides universal, long-term, needs-
based cash transfers that guarantee a social minimum in-
come to all families. The second tier provides cash support
to those available for employment and expected to work, but
who are temporarily unemployed. These benefits are usu-
ally conditional on past work, limited in duration, and may
be needs-based. The third tier targets benefits to those not
expected to work – the aged, disabled, etc. – and can either
be needs-based or based on past earnings. Since recipients
of these benefits are not expected to return to employment,
benefits are typically higher and not time limited.
When these tiers provide substantially different amounts
of income and their categories are mutable, a considerable
responsibility falls on program gatekeepers to consistently
determine who should come onto the program. For retire-
ment programs this is straightforward; age is an arbitrary
but easily verifiable eligibility marker. Eligibility determi-
nations by program gatekeepers will be straightforward and
program caseloads will be predictable based on knowable
trends in population composition.
Disability is more difficult. Unlike retirement, there is no
precise definition or easily verifiable marker for determin-
ing categorical eligibility for long-term disability benefits.
Moreover, disability is not a static concept and social con-
ceptualizations of disability evolve over time. For exam-
ple, over the past 20 years, the medical model of disability
underlying categorical disability programs in most OECD
countries has been rejected and replaced by a conceptualiza-
tion that recognizes that the social environment is as impor-
tant as health in determining an individual’s ability to par-
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Panel A. DI Recipients per 100 Working Age Population in Germany
Eligibility standards relatively generous 
Tightening of eligibility 
conditions: must have paid 















potential assessed  for 
all jobs, not just in 
recent or comparable 
occupation.
Standards substantially tightened Structural reforms and focus on accomodation
October 1990 
Reunification
Self-employed and housewifes 
become eligible for Statutory 
Pension Insurance. Disabled 
workers can officially retire 
without deductions at age 62. 
Fig. 3 Disability Recipients per 100 Working Age Population by Country and Related Reforms
ticipate in society (WHO, 2001).7 Under this model, “work
disability” is a changeable state that depends on a number of
factors, including an individual’s health-based impairment,
the level of accommodation offered in the workplace, and
the relative economic rewards associated with working or
exiting the labor force to receive disability benefits.
The fluid nature of the disability category has meant
that changes to disability policy parameters such as who is
covered for program benefits, the level of benefits – both
absolutely and relative to alternative programs or wage
earnings – and the breadth and severity of the qualifying
conditions can influence caseload growth and disability re-
cipiency rates. This potential is especially acute in the
context of reductions in other forms of social protection or
changes in the broader economy.
7 There is no clear consensus on the most appropriate conceptu-
alization of disability, although the most widely used is the World
Health Organization’s (WHO) International Classification of Disabil-
ity, Health, and Functioning (WHO, 2001). Burkhauser and Schroeder
(2007) propose a method to harmonize classifications in surveys.
For example, in a number of industrialized nations, the
relative value of disability benefits has risen significantly
over time, as policymakers have cut payments or imposed
stricter eligibility criteria on other benefit programs includ-
ing unemployment insurance and general welfare. Struc-
tural changes in the economy including the declining job
and wage prospects for low-skilled workers also have made
disability benefits more attractive as means of long-term in-
come support. Finally, disability benefits have increasingly
become an option for displaced or long-term unemployed
workers dislocated during economic downturns. Since very
few disability beneficiaries ever return to the labor market,
the growth in the rolls that occurs during and after reces-
sions account for some of the long-term increase in disabil-
ity recipiency rates. These rates then remain elevated until
these recession induced cohorts of beneficiaries age out of
the system or die. For a more detailed discussion of these
issues in OECD nations see OECD (2010).
Below we discuss how disability program designs and
changes in disability policy parameters in three EU coun-
tries (Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden) and in the
U.S. are related to disability recipiency rates in each coun-
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Panel B. DI Recipients per 100 Working Age Population in the Netherlands 
Replacement rates up to 80% with 
a 15% impairment standard
Courts rule that unless proven otherwise partially 
disabled workers are unemployed due to discrimination
Replacement rate cut from 80%
to 70% of after tax income
Labor market rule 
abolished
Further tightening of eligibility 
criteria, firms now responsible for 
first 6 weeks of employee's sick pay
Firms now responsible for first 







Fig. 3 (Continued) Disability Recipients per 100 Working Age Population by Country and Related Reforms
try. When relevant, we also discuss how these policy struc-
tures may have interacted with macroeconomic conditions
and the broader social safety net to account for growth in
the disability rolls. For reference, Fig. 3 (Panels A through
D) show disability recipiency rates along with major policy
changes over time for each country. Table 2 provides key
information about the current state of disability programs
in each nation.
3.1 The German experience
Germany, like most European nations, has a long-stand-
ing first-tier, universal needs-based cash transfer program
that provides a guaranteed social minimum income floor
to all its citizens. Benefits are funded out of general rev-
enues. To reduce the high structural unemployment rate,
the center-left government implemented major reforms in
2004 (‘Hartz IV Reforms’). The reforms fundamentally al-
tered Germany’s Tier I program, cut benefits and impose
job search and job training requirements on beneficiaries.8
In general, Tier I beneficiaries are considered “able to work”
and part of the active labor force in Germany.9 Benefits lev-
els are set nationally and vary across individuals based on
household size and composition.
Germany also provides second and third tier benefits.
Second tier benefits consist primarily of unemployment in-
surance (UI). To receive unemployment benefits, workers
must have paid social UI contribution rates for at least 12
of the last 24 months prior to applying. Unemployed work-
ers under the age of 50 are paid benefits (Arbeitslosengeld
I) for up to 12 months. After age 50, the maximum du-
ration increases gradually with age. For workers without
8 The 2004 reforms created the Arbeitslosengeld II program (Sozialge-
setzbuch II, “Social Code Book II”). For more information about the
reforms see, e. g. Eichhorst et al. (2008), Konle-Seidl (2012).
9 People are considered to be “able to work” if they are judged to be
able to work at least 3 hours per day. A relatively small share of peo-
ple receive Sozialhilfe (Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt) (“Social Assistance
Benefits”) of a similar amount but have no job search requirement and
are not considered to be in the labor force (§§27–40 SGB XII). These
beneficiaries are typically “long-term unemployed” and classified as
temporarily not able to work 3 hours per day.
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Panel C. DI Recipients per 100 Working Age Population in Sweden
Eligibility standards loosened for long 
term unemployed, sickness benefits 
replace up to 90% of earnings 
throughout this period 
Replacement rates lowered, 
employer's now pay first 14 days of 
sickness, pure labor market
considerations removed
Reforms implemented designed to 
increase employer cost of employee 
sickness
Sweeping reforms 
implemented focusing on 
work support rather than 
cash assistance
Sickness & disability 










Fig. 3 (Continued) Disability Recipients per 100 Working Age Population by Country and Related Reforms
children, the UI replacement rate is 60 % of the average
monthly wage earnings over the previous year; unemployed
workers with children receive 67 % of prior earnings. Un-
employment benefits are funded by payroll taxes up to the
annual social insurance contribution ceiling of C72,600
($87,000).10 Employers and employees each pay 1.5 % of
the gross wage.
Third tier benefits in Germany include the Statutory Old-
Age Pension Scheme (OAP) and the Work Disability Pen-
sion (WDP) for both partially and totally disabled workers.
Both programs pay benefits to workers who have paid into
the systems during their work life. Similar to UI, employers
and employees are each subject to a payroll tax – 9.35 % –
of their monthly gross wage up to the social insurance con-
tribution ceiling. In 2014, total WDP benefits were about
10 In the eastern states of Germany, the rates are the same but the an-
nual social insurance ceiling is lower – C62,400 ($75,000).
C11 billion, or 4.2 % of total OPA/WDP spending (DRV,
2014a, b and c; BMAS, 2014).11
In Germany, like other EU countries, workers also are
eligible for both short- and long-term statutory sickness in-
surance benefits.12 While these benefits can be the gateway
to WDP, they are not considered Tier 3 programs because
they are time limited. Employers are required to provide
short-term sickness benefits. In case of sickness, workers
receive 100 % of their wages up to six weeks per sick-
ness spell (Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2010, 2014).13 Workers
with longer spells are reevaluated for access to long-term
11 The figure of C11 billion is based on an indirect calculation multi-
plying the 78,689 partial WDP beneficiaries with their annual average
cash benefit of C5844 and adding the 1,224,177 full WDP beneficiaries
and their average annual benefit received of C8604 (DRV, 2014a,b,c).
12 Similar to the Workers Compensation program in the U.S., Germany
also has a separate Statutory Accident Insurance (SAI) program cover-
ing temporary and permanent work absences in case of work accidents
or diseases. But unlike the U.S. it is administered at the federal rather
than the state level.
13 Short-term sick leave benefits were cut to 80 % of wages in October
1996 but this reform was politically unsustainable and was reversed in
1999. For a discussion see Ziebarth and Karlsson (2014).
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Panel D. DI Recipients per 100 Working Age Population in the United States
Continuous disability requirement 
relaxed to 5 months of disability
DI recipients eleigible for Medicare 
after 24 months of continuous disability
Medical screening process 
tightened
Congress rmandates that all 
all current recipients are  
reevaluted for eligibility
AIME benefits calculator revised
Benefits Reform Act: 
screenings shifted from  
medical to functional criteria
Gatekeepers implement stricter
interpretation  of eligibility criteria 
Eligibility during this time period is increasingly granted based 
upon  vocational rather than medical criteria
Fig. 3 (Continued) Disability Recipients per 100 Working Age Population by Country and Related Reforms
sickness benefits. These benefits are publically funded and
replace 70 % of net wages for up to 78 weeks (see Ziebarth
(2009, 2013) for additional details).
In the early 1970s, of the four countries compared in
Fig. 1, Germany had the highest disability recipiency rate.
One element that potentially contributed to this high rate
was a change in WDP rules in 1969. The reform fell into
the booming post-WWII era when the social welfare state
was expanded. This particular reform allowed partially dis-
abled workers to receive full WDP benefits if they were
unable to find a job (Burkhauser and Hirvonen, 1989). Fur-
ther expansions in 1972 extended coverage to housewives
and the self-employed. It also provided gateways to the
retirement program at age 62 without actuarial benefit re-
ductions. As seen in Panel A of Fig. 3, in the aftermath of
the reforms, disability recipiency rose significantly, peaking
at 5.8 % in 1984.
A substantial tightening of WDP eligibility criteria fol-
lowed this rapid growth in recipiency rates. Passed by the
center-right government elected in 1982, WDP reforms in
the early 1980s limited eligibility to workers who had paid
payroll taxes over the past three out of five years. Because
many housewives did not meet these “market work crite-
ria,” this restriction greatly curtailed their WDP coverage.
The strong decline in DI recipiency rates between 1984
and 1990 has been attributed to the restriction in access for
women working outside the formal labor market (see RKI,
2006 as well as Börsch-Supan and Jürges, 2012 for a more
detailed discussion). In the aftermath of these eligibility re-
forms, growth in recipiency rates turned negative (Table 1),
more than undoing the increases over the previous decades
(Fig. 3, Panel A).
Additional reforms were launched in the 1990s and
2000s in reunified Germany. Actuarial reductions and caps
on the earnings of WDP beneficiaries were introduced in
1996. Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2012) report that the num-
ber of new male WDP beneficiaries fell from an average
of about 150,000 p. a. prior to these reforms to 75,000 p. a.
This strong reduction in the inflow of new male beneficia-
ries contributed to the decline in DI recipiency rates over
K
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Table 2 Disability Program Parameters Across Countries as of 2013





gram with a disability
program which makes
a strict distinction be-
tween fully and partially
disabled. Those fully
disabled receive guaran-
teed income until age 65
while partially disabled
workers receive benefits
conditional on work his-
tory and incapacity level
determined by doctor
Merged sickness pro-
gram with a disability
system with disability
benefits granted only to




with a disability program
which makes a distinction
between fully and partially
disabled. Disability is de-
termined by ability to work
between 3 and 6 (partial),
and less than 3 (full) hours
per day. Coverage restricted
to those who have paid social
insurance contribution rates
with benefit levels tied to
past earnings
No mandatory sickness program.
Only those fully and perma-
nently disabled eligible for bene-
fits. Coverage restricted to those
who have paid social security
taxes over their working lives











sickness benefits in the
event of a sickness (with
approval of a doctor),
however disability insur-
ance is only granted to
those with a serious and
permanent impairment
that reduces work ability
Program differentiates be-
tween full and partial disabil-
ity and awards benefits ac-
cordingly (see above). Coex-
isting employer mandate for
businesses >19 employees:
employ at least 5 % severely
disabled or pay penalty
Disability program designed
to be a last resort program for






(either a company doctor
or agency) who evaluate
incapacity. Several eval-
uations are carried out by
integration supervisors
on a rolling timeline dur-
ing the initial two year
sickness period
Sickness benefits are
awarded for first 14 days
with a doctors approval
and reevaluated along
a rolling timeline with
worker “check-ins”.
Disability benefits are





tees 100 percent sick pay
for first 6 weeks. Ongoing
sickness is insured by statu-
tory long-term sick pay –
80 % of gross wage – up to




since 2004. DI applicants
must present diagnoses doc-
umenting inability to work




Full disability program requir-
ing applicants to be unable to
perform any substantial gainful




Yes. Benefits levels are
conditional on past earn-
ings, number of weeks
worked before, and the
percentage of earnings
the worker is deemed
capable of earning cur-
rently with impairment




assistance to all those
residing in Sweden. The
earnings related pen-
sion is contingent upon
weeks of work and past
earnings
Yes, 3 out of last 5 years of
coverage necessary before
onset of disability. Waiting
period of 5 years
Yes, sufficient quarters of cov-
erage necessary as defined de-











other programs are de-
signed to accommodate
those who have severe,
long-term disabilities
meeting specific criteria
Specific income tax deduc-
tions, 2 years of earlier reg-
ular retirement, subsidized
public transportation and
other public services de-
signed to accommodate those
who are classified “severely
handicapped” (disability
degree at least 50 %)
Workers Comp and SSI and
private disability insurance
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the rest of the decade, as evidenced in Fig. 3, Panel A and
Table 1.14
Another round of structural WDP reforms was intro-
duced in 2001. Most important was the tightening in
the work-limited eligibility standard from “being unable
to work in the occupation in which one was trained” –
effectively in the last job or a comparable job in terms
of the skills it required, the wages it paid and its pres-
tige – to “being unable to work in any job available in
the economy” (change from Erwerbsunfähigkeitsrente to
Erwerbsminderungsrente). As we will describe later, this
reform made eligibility for WDP benefits stricter than the
typical eligibility criteria in the private market for DI ben-
efits. Following this policy change, total inflows onto the
WDP program decreased further, falling from 200,000 in
2001 to 160,000 in 2005 (Krause et al. 2013, DRV 2014b).
WDP reforms in 2004 continued to focus on reducing
the inflow of new recipients. However, the attention shifted
away from tightening WDP eligibility requirements towards
promoting worker accommodation on the job. Specifi-
cally, the reforms mandated employers to provide work-
place reintegration management programs. Indeed, the law
requires that when impaired workers exhaust their short-
term sickness benefits (six weeks) and are being consid-
ered for longer-term sickness benefits, employers must co-
ordinate a plan that includes input from: the sick-listed
employee, WDP experts, the worker council, and the work-
place physician. The plan is meant to ensure that the em-
ployee’s temporary work disability can be overcome and to
prevent future reductions in work capacity.
The experience of Germany over the past four decades
is a useful illustration of the role that policy decisions can
play on the dynamics of disability recipiency rates. When
Germany was expanding both the coverage and generosity
of disability benefits, recipiency rates were high and rising
relative to other countries. WDP program growth subse-
quently declined in the aftermath of reforms that limited
access, made benefits less attractive and required employers
to implement a workplace reintegration program. Germany
is the only country in our sample whose disability recipi-
ency rate is now below its 1970 level. As can be seen in
the bottom row of Table 1, annual growth rates over the en-
tire period of our analysis (1970 to our most recent year of
data) averaged –0.96 % in Germany compared to +2.50 %
in the Netherlands, +2.25 % in Sweden and +2.99 % in the
U.S.
Private Disability Insurance. Notably, the policy
changes in Germany that reduced the size of the public
WDP program were correlated with an increase in the
14 Note that the figures reflect the stock of all beneficiaries. As such,
even large declines in the inflow of new beneficiaries only gradually
translate into overall DI rate declines.
market for private disability insurance (Fig. 4). The ma-
jority of private DI policies provide benefits to covered
workers who have established that a health shock led to
reduced work capacity in the current (or a comparable)
occupation (Berufsunfähigkeitsversicherung as compared
to Erwerbsunfähigkeitsversicherung) – a less difficult level
of work incapacity to meet for benefit eligibility than the
one imposed by WDP since 2001. As shown in Fig. 4,
the number of new private DI policies in Germany grew
slowly from 1976 through the mid-1990s. But growth
increased substantially around the introduction of actuarial
reductions and caps on the earnings of WDP beneficiaries
in 1996. Growth in new private policies increased further
in 2001. This is the year that WDP eligibility was limited
to workers who were unable to perform any work in the
economy.15 In 2012, 61 % of employed men and 42 %
of employed women were covered by private disability
insurance (Statistika, 2014).16
While the expansion of private disability insurance sug-
gests that many Germans responded to the reductions in
public WDP benefits by purchasing alternative private poli-
cies, to our knowledge no research on this substitution has
been published. Even if individuals are augmenting the
WDP program with private insurance, the substitution is
likely not perfect. Private disability insurance plans are
experience rated and individually underwritten. Private dis-
ability insurance follows private insurance law and is based
on a private contract between the insurer and the insured,
which specifies the conditions for the insured risk individ-
ually. Premiums depend on age, medical diagnoses, and
occupation. As a result, premiums can be very high for
high-risk occupations and applicants may be denied cover-
age.
3.2 The Netherlands17
As in Germany, the disability system in the Netherlands
contains both a social insurance program that protects work-
ers against lost labor earnings and a program that provides
a social minimum for disabled adults with little or no work
history. A separate social minimum scheme for the disabled
15 Conversations with German Association of Insurers (GDV) repre-
sentatives confirm that no industry-specific supply-side factors have
been driving this trend.
16 Beneficiaries of private disability insurance may also receive WDP
benefits if they are eligible. This contrasts with the U.S. market where
private insurers may reduce payments dollar for dollar for recipients
of public Social Security Disability Insurance. This means that private
insurers in Germany have more of an incentive to return beneficiaries
to work than do those in the U.S. (see Burkhauser and Daly 2011 for a
fuller discussion of this point).
17 A longer version of this summary of the Dutch system can be found
in Burkhauser and Daly (2011).
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Fig. 4 New Private DI Policies
in Germany. (Source: Associa-
































































































































































self-employed ended in 2004. The Dutch social insurance
program (WAO/WIA) provides cash transfers to working-
age men and women based on lost labor earnings. The
Netherlands does not have a separate program similar to
Workers’ Compensation in Germany, Sweden or the U.S.
Rather it has a longer-term disability transfer program that,
together with sickness benefits all private firms must offer,
provides a comprehensive system of both partial and total
disability benefits to workers regardless of how or where
their disability occurred. The Dutch also have a categori-
cal disability-based welfare program (Wajong) that, unlike
the general welfare scheme, is not means tested. This pro-
gram is similar to the SSI-disabled adults program in the
U.S. It targets men and women whose disabilities occurred
prior to their entrance into the labor force and are severe
enough that they have not engaged in full-time employment
as adults (see Table 2 for details of the disability program
in the Netherlands).
The Dutch disability program grew rapidly over the
1970s. This was a time when the system provided rela-
tively generous benefits (Fig. 3, Panel B). In the 1970s,
government payments from the universal sickness benefit
system – essentially a universal short-term disability system
– replaced up to 80 % of net wage earnings for up to one
year. And most employees (90 %) had the rest of their net-
of-tax earnings replaced by collective-bargaining agree-
ments with their employers. These disability replacement
rates were far in excess of comparable programs in the U.S.
and many other European nations. Sickness benefits were
payable for up to twelve months. After one year, employees
still receiving benefits were eligible for disability benefit
screening. Workers with chronic conditions that caused a
reduction in their capacity to perform work commensurate
with their job training and work history were eligible for
disability benefits. Those judged fully disabled were el-
igible for benefits equal to 80 % of their gross earnings.
Those judged partially disabled (those with some residual
earnings capacity) were eligible for partial benefits; the
minimum degree of impairment for eligibility was 15 %.
In a significant loosening of access to full disability ben-
efits in the mid-1970s, Dutch courts determined that unless
disability evaluators could prove otherwise, they were re-
quired to attribute a partially disabled worker’s lack of em-
ployment to discriminatory behavior. The result was that it
became “administrative practice” to treat unemployed, par-
tially disabled persons as if they were fully disabled. That
interpretation of the law made assessing lost earnings ca-
pacity unnecessary beyond the minimum 15 %. This prac-
tice essentially made the Dutch partial disability system a
very generous full disability program. Consequently, in the
1970s, the disability recipiency rate in the Netherlands grew
11.15 % per year (Table 1; Fig. 3, Panel B).
Reforms initiated between 1982 and 1987 were the first
of three major efforts over the next two decades to regain
control of the Dutch disability transfer system. By 1985,
a series of cuts in the replacement rate effectively lowered
it from 80 % of gross earnings to 70 % of net earnings for
both new entrants and current beneficiaries. In addtion, in
1987 the labor market consideration rule was completely
abolished. Despite the legal ban on including labor-market
considerations in their assessments, disability adjudicators
still tended either to grant or deny full benefits. Denial rates
remained quite low, suggesting that the legal change did
not stop the de facto use of labor-market considerations in
the adjudication process. Nonetheless these changes were
accompanied by slower growth in disability recipiency in
the 1980s, on average 1.78 % per year (Table 1). This
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brought the Netherlands more in line with disability growth
in Sweden.
In 1994, the Dutch government introduced several ad-
ditional reforms including measures to further tighten eli-
gibility criteria. And in a new policy, private firms were
made responsible for an employee’s first six weeks of sick
pay. The introduction of some “privatization” of the dis-
ability system was new in the Netherlands and represented
a change in policy intended to encourage firms to provide
accommodation, rehabilitation, and continued employment
opportunities to workers as an alternative to moving them
onto long-term cash benefits. The mandate that firms would
bear the full responsibility for sick pay was extended from
six weeks to one year in 1996. Despite these reforms, the
decline in the Dutch disability recipiency rate stopped in
1997. It began to slowly climb again. Still, the average
growth in the beneficiary rate in the 1990s was a mere neg-
ative 0.37 % (Table 1).
In 2002, the Dutch disability system began to phase in
the third and most significant set of reforms. These re-
forms culminated in the establishment of a new disability
insurance scheme in 2004 – WIA – which replaced the
WAO scheme that had been in place since 1967. These
systemic reforms fundamentally altered disability policy in
the Netherlands. The reforms deliberately made work rather
than cash benefits the expectation and enforced this by in-
creasing the incentives of both employees and their em-
ployers to invest more time and effort in accommodation
and rehabilitation following the onset of a disability.
Foremost among the reforms was the extension from one
year to two years of the mandate that firms (including small
employers) bear full responsibility for employees’ sick pay.
These changes effectively meant that during the first two
years following a health shock, workers were the responsi-
bility of the firm and not eligible for long-term government
provided disability benefits. During these two years, em-
ployers were required to allow workers receiving sickness
benefits to remain with the firm; dismal was allowed only
for employees who refused to cooperate in a reasonable
work-resumption plan.
The reforms also gave firms a list of prescribed rehabili-
tation and accommodation activities that they (via a private
occupational health agency) had to provide to assist workers
in remaining on the job or finding alternative employment.
When the two years were complete, workers were allowed
to apply for long-term disability benefits, but they were re-
quired to provide documentation regarding return-to-work
efforts during the two-year period. In 2007, nearly 14 %
of disability insurance claims were returned to employers
and the employer continued to be responsible for employ-
ing the worker until the claim was processed or the worker
had returned to the old or a new job.
Reforms at the front end of the process were accompa-
nied by significant reforms in the longer-term benefit pro-
gram. All employers were made to pay for the full and
permanent disability program through a uniform pay-as-
you-go premium rate. Employers also had to pay to fund
the publicly run partial disability program, but they could
opt out of it by enrolling their workers with a private insurer
instead. Either way, employers had to pay experience-rated
premiums that covered the first ten years of partial disabil-
ity benefit receipt. After ten years, the financial burden
would shift to the uniform pay-as-you-go rates that also
cover the fully and permanently disabled and the stock of
current beneficiaries under the old system. Table 1 shows
that the average growth rate in the Dutch DI program was
-1.28 % in the new millennium.
Borghans et al. (2014) provide evidence that the reduc-
tion in benefits for current Dutch disability insurance recipi-
ents in the reforms of 1992/1993 lead to both their increased
use of alternative social welfare programs and greater earn-
ings from employment over the next decade. They argue
that, on average, increased income from these two alterna-
tive sources fully offset the cut in their DI benefits. While
it is still too early to determine the full effect of more
recent policy changes on the Dutch disability beneficiary
population, Van Sonsbeek and Gradus (2011) provide the
first micro-simulation of the consequences of the post-2002
round of policy changes discussed above. They estimate
that the combined impact of the introduction of experience
rating together with the introduction of the statutory Gate-
keeper Protocol and stricter examinations will reduce the
projected long-term number of disability beneficiaries by
600,000. The also estimate that the introduction of the new
WIA scheme will further reduce that projected number by
250,000 by 2040, as compared to a “no-change scenario.”
Koning and Lindeboom (2015) provide the most recent re-
view of the consequences of the Dutch disability reforms
on program enrollment and a review of the literature on this
topic.
Overall, the research on the effectiveness of the Dutch
disability reforms supports the ideas that policy design mat-
ters for the outcomes of individuals with impairments and
suggests that, with assistance, many workers who experi-
ence a health shock can remain productively in the labor
market.
3.3 Sweden
Like most European nations Sweden has a long-standing
first-tier, universal needs-based cash transfer program that
provides a guaranteed social minimum income floor to all
its citizens. This first-tier protection is funded out of gen-
eral revenues and is available to everyone who lives or
works in Sweden. Although benefits provide minimum in-
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come to anyone in need, applicants apply for benefits based
on income and particular circumstances, such as disability,
parental needs, or old age. Benefits are set nationally and
indexed to keep pace with the price level.
Sweden also provides second and third tier benefits. The
second tier in Sweden includes unemployment insurance
benefits, which include both a mandatory and voluntary
component. The mandatory component is paid for by all
employers and replaces a minimum fraction of wages for
covered workers. The number of weeks covered by unem-
ployment insurance has fluctuated over time but is generally
longer than in the U.S. Most individuals also are covered
by voluntary unemployment insurance which is negotiated
between firms and trade unions. Somewhat uniquely among
the countries we review, Sweden also has many private op-
tions for unemployment insurance; these may be purchased
individually or through an employer.
Sweden provides third tier benefits, including old-age
pensions and sickness and disability benefits, through a
combination of programs. For those with an earnings his-
tory, the bulk of the protection is provided based on a social
insurance program that, as in the U.S., is financed by statu-
tory employer and employee contributions. Many employ-
ers in Sweden also pay into occupational-based insurance
and pension programs on behalf of their employees. Partic-
ipation in these schemes is driven by competitive forces or
collective bargaining agreements with unions but a major-
ity of employers in Sweden participate in these programs.
Table 2 provides more details about the Swedish disability
system.
As in the Netherlands, the Swedish disability program
was relatively generous and expanding rapidly in the 1970s
with average annual growth rates of 5.46 % (see Table 1).
The first level of protection for Swedish workers with health
problems is a sickness benefit. In the 1970s, sickness ben-
efits replaced about 90 % of expected earnings for individ-
uals with “abnormal physical or mental conditions” that re-
duced their normal work capacity by at least 25 %. Workers
claiming sickness absence for more than eight days were
required to get a certificate from a doctor. This was primar-
ily facilitated by the individual’s doctor with no centralized
screening or standards.
After one year, employees still receiving benefits could
apply for long-term disability insurance. Workers with
functional limitations that caused a reduction in their ca-
pacity to perform work commensurate with their job train-
ing and work history were eligible for disability benefits.
Benefits were awarded for partial (50 %) and full disability
(Andrén 2014). For those under age 60, benefits included
rehabilitation and vocational training. For those 60 and
older, beneficiaries were provided income support. Like
sickness benefits, disability benefits were very generous re-
placing the vast majority of lost earnings.
Over the course of the 1970s, standards for obtaining
long-term disability benefits were also loosened to make
it easier for the long-term unemployed to move onto the
program. For workers of all ages, unemployment spells
of more than one year were added to the list of criteria
considered in the disability screening process. For work-
ers over age 60, long-term unemployed became a sufficient
condition for moving onto disability benefits, even with-
out a certifiable functional limitation. Similar to the Dutch
case, these changes meant that the disability benefit pro-
gram was increasingly being used as a very generous long-
term unemployment insurance program.18
Generous benefits and easier access correlated with
steady growth in disability recipiency rates over the 1970s
and 1980s (Fig. 3, Panel C). These features also left the
program vulnerable to growth related to the serious re-
cession in the early 1990s. As shown in Fig. 3, Panel
C, following the foreign exchange crisis in 1990 and en-
suing deep recession, disability recipiency rates surged.
Policymakers responded by lowering the replacement rates
on sickness benefits, making employers pay for the first
14 days of sickness absence, and removing the pure labor
market criteria for disability benefits for older workers.
With these changes to policy and an improving economy,
disability recipiency rates stabilized for most of the rest of
the decade. That said, they remained relatively high and at
a level that some policymakers argued was unsustainable.
As such, additional policy reforms were made throughout
the 1990s. These reforms were designed to increase the
employer cost of worker sickness absence and increase
the threshold for workers applying for sickness and/or
disability benefits.19
Facing increasing fiscal pressures and a renewal of dis-
ability recipiency rate growth (Fig. 3, Panel C), in 2000
the Swedish government proposed much more sweeping
reforms to the sickness and disability system. Despite con-
siderable opposition from various advocacy groups, signif-
icant reforms were put into place over the remainder of the
decade. The driving principle behind the reforms was that
work support, rather than cash assistance in lieu of work,
was the primary goal of disability policy.
This general principle translated into a number of impor-
tant specific reforms. In 2003, the government merged the
sickness benefits and disability systems and began a series
of changes to standardize and enforce the administration of
18 Econometric studies of the Swedish system support this view. See
for example Rebick (1994) and Larsson (2006).
19 The Swedish government made numerous changes to sickness ben-
efit replacement rates, the number of days the employer paid for em-
ployee sickness absence, and the number of days the worker had to wait
before receiving sickness benefits (Andrén 2003). In addition, policy-
makers removed most of the special allowances for disability insurance
afforded to unemployed and older workers (Jönsson et al. 2011).
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these now joint systems. Most notable among them was the
centralization of screening processes. Up until this point,
certification for sickness benefits had been variable as had
disability benefit allowance rates. Although rehabilitation
and vocational training were goals, many doctors and re-
gional disability gatekeepers focused on providing income
support rather than employment retraining. By centraliz-
ing the process and developing standardized protocols for
granting cash benefits, policymakers were better able to
regulate the gatekeepers and enforce the strategy of pro-
moting participation in work before offering cash benefits.
Although it is too early to judge the effectiveness, the idea
is that this standardization will temper the link between re-
gional economic conditions and disability recipiency that
had historically been present.
In addition to standardizing the screening process, the
merger of the sickness and disability programs forced dis-
ability gatekeepers to become actively involved early in the
process. By getting vocational and rehabilitation experts
involved early, at the sickness benefit stage, policymakers
intended to stem the flow of new applicants to the long-term
disability program. To aid in this process, sickness benefits
were capped at one year, and beneficiaries were evaluated
for work ability at 180 days of absence. Only those who
could show that they had no capacity to perform any job
were allowed to remain on the program for the full year. In
addition, employers were required to work with disability
administrators to create a rehabilitation plan. And gatekeep-
ers were given the power to demand that employers provide
certification about the types of accommodations they made
for the worker. In the aftermath of these reforms, the use of
sickness benefits declined as did the flow of new beneficia-
ries onto the long-term disability system. This correlation
between policy changes and declines in benefit use, to our
knowledge, has not been causally established in published
research.
In 2008 the Swedish government undertook an additional
series of reforms to its sickness and long-term disability
programs (these reforms are detailed in Hartman (2011)
and OECD (2009)). These reforms were meant to further
curb growth in the rolls and more actively return newly
impaired workers to back to the labor market. The 2008
reforms went beyond engaging gatekeepers and employ-
ers and focused on individuals with disabilities. New rules
aimed at strengthening the incentives for individuals with
disabilities to work and improving their opportunities to
do so. The principal reform was the establishment of a
new timeline for the provision of rehabilitation services un-
der the sickness absence program with checkpoints closely
aligned with assessment of work capacity and a reduction
of the cash value of sickness benefits for those who did not
return to work. In addition to adding more checkpoints,
the reforms also front-loaded the evaluations so that they
were being done at 3-, 6-, and 12-month increments. The
earlier checkpoints provided rehabilitation, counseling and
assessment much closer to the onset of an impairment when
return to work was more likely.
After the reforms, new sickness program entrants re-
turned to work more quickly and reduced their overall time
on the program (Hartman, 2011). In contrast, few of those
already on the sickness program when the new reforms
were initiated ever returned to work. These findings pro-
vide support for the idea that early intervention matters.
Waiting even one year following the onset of impairment
significantly reduces the chance that rehabilitation will re-
sult in a return to work. The disability reforms put in place
by the Swedish government late in the 2000s appear to
have helped curb growth in disability recipiency rates in
the nation (Fig. 3, Panel C).
3.4 The U.S. experience
Unlike the three EU countries discussed above, the United
States has no first-tier, universal needs-based cash transfer
program that provides a guaranteed social minimum in-
come floor to all its citizens. The Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program, which is limited to the aged, dis-
abled adults and parents of disabled children, is the only
long-term needs-based cash transfer program.20,21 The only
other major categorical needs-based cash transfer program
in the U.S. is Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF), which is targeted at single mothers and provides
an even lower guaranteed income level and the guarantee
is limited to 5 years.
The second tier in the U.S. includes unemployment in-
surance benefits, which replace a fraction of wages for cov-
ered workers for short periods of time. In normal economic
times, unemployment benefits can last up to 26 weeks. Dur-
ing recessions, this maximum is often extended and it rose
to 99 weeks in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis.
Unemployment insurance benefits are generally higher than
SSI or TANF benefits.
The social security Old-Age Retirement and Survivors
Insurance (OAI) and Disability Insurance (DI) programs
make up the third tier of benefits in the U.S.; they provide
social insurance to workers who have paid social security
20 SSI is similar in design to the Dutch categorical disability-based
welfare program (Wajong) but its income guarantee level is substan-
tially lower than either.
21 The SSI aged and disabled adults programs share the same categori-
cal eligibility criteria applied for the earnings based retirement or Old-
Age Retirement and Survivors Insurance (OAI) and Disability Insur-
ance (DI) programs. Individuals with sufficiently low earnings records
may jointly qualify for OAI and SSI aged benefits and for DI and SSI
disabled adult benefits. This said, these programs are generally treated
separately by policymakers.
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taxes over their working life.22 To be eligible for benefits,
workers must have accumulated sufficient quarters of cov-
erage, as defined in the Social Security Administration’s
pension rules. These requirements are sufficiently strict to
limit OAI and DI benefits to those with substantial attach-
ments to the labor market (for a summary of the benefit
requirements and rules, see Social Security Administration
(2013a)). Benefit levels from these programs are based
on past earnings. They can be substantially higher than
the benefits guaranteed by the SSI aged and disability pro-
grams.
Eligibility for DI benefits requires applicants to meet a
federal disability standard applied by administrative evalu-
ators and adjudicators located in each state. The criteria are
in principle quite strict. Eligibility requires that a worker
be “unable to perform any substantial gainful activity on
any job in the economy for at least one year”. There is
no benefit for partial disability. Disability benefits are in-
tended to be a last-resort for those with permanent and total
impairments. Table 2 provides more details on the U.S. DI
program.
Although the written eligibility criteria have not changed
over time, their implementation has changed in a direction
that has increased the number of working-aged adults re-
ceiving disability benefits. Indeed, many of the disability
recipiency rate fluctuations shown in Fig. 1 and Table 1
line up with changes in Social Security Administration
(SSA) policies. For example, rapid disability recipiency
rate growth of an average of 5.57 % p. a. in the 1970s aligns
with Congressional actions that increased the replacement
rate for a disabled worker with median earnings from 35 to
49 % (Fig. 3, Panel D). In the late 1970s and early 1980s
disability recipiency rates fell, first because program gate-
keepers were urged to more strictly interpret existing rules.
And then because, in 1980, Congress required SSA to re-
evaluate all current recipients to see if they still met the
medical standards. This rule change, which was rigorously
enforced by SSA at the start of the new Reagan adminis-
tration, resulted in a drop in the DI rolls despite a major
recession – the substantial drop in normalized adjusted dis-
ability recipiency rates in the U.S. between 1978 and 1983
are in stark contrast to the sizable growth in these values
before 1978 and after 1990 (Fig. 3, Panel D).
By 1983 the widespread reevaluation of those already
on DI was halted as the courts and then Congress restricted
the SSA’s power to reevaluate beneficiaries. Furthermore,
in 1984, responding to a backlash against restrictive cuts
imposed in the Social Security Disability Amendments of
1980, policymakers expanded the ways in which a person
22 Autor et al. (2014) provide a detailed analysis and discussion of the
private disability insurance market in the U.S., which is significantly
smaller than the private market in Germany.
could medically qualify for the DI program. The 1984 leg-
islation moved away from a strict medical listing determina-
tion of eligibility to one that also considered an applicant’s
overall medical condition and ability to work. In addition,
the legislation allowed for symptoms of mental illness and
pain to be counted when assessing DI eligibility, regardless
of whether the person had a verifiable medical diagnosis
(Fig. 3, Panel D).23
The expansion of eligibility to more difficult to mea-
sure impairments that do not precisely meet the medical
listings means that SSA has increasingly been tasked with
making more subjective decisions about the impact that im-
pairments might have on an applicant’s work ability. For
applicants who do not meet the medical listings, program
administrators consider a set of vocational criteria. While
these vocational criteria have been in place over the his-
tory of the DI program, their use by program gatekeepers
to determine benefit eligibility has risen dramatically since
1991. Currently, they are used to justify the majority of new
awards, especially among those with the more difficult to
determine conditions of mental illness and musculoskeletal
conditions – the primary condition of more than 50 % of all
newly enrolled beneficiaries (Burkhauser and Daly, 2011).
One consequence of expanding eligibility beyond identi-
fiable medical listings is that DI applicants and gatekeepers
have much more of a role in determining program growth.
For example, over time, the cyclical sensitivity of DI appli-
cation rates has risen considerably. Applications rise during
recessions and fall during periods of economic growth (see
Rupp and Stapleton, 1995; Stapleton et al. 1998; Black
et al. 2002; Autor and Duggan, 2003; Liebman, 2015).
But as can be seen in Fig. 3, Panel D, increased applica-
tions generally result in an increase in disability recipiency
rates which do not subside as economic conditions improve.
Once on, very few beneficiaries ever leave the program.
In addition to the cyclical sensitivity of disability appli-
cations and awards, there is evidence that there has been a
secular rise in the number of workers who apply related to
the (unintentional) increase in the DI replacement rates for
low wage workers (Autor and Duggan, 2003). Bound and
Burkhauser (1999) provide an early review of the literature
on the labor supply effects of disability insurance. Since
then researchers have consistently found a negative effect
of DI program work constraints on employment – see Chen
and van der Klaauw (2008), von Wachter et al. (2011), or
Moore (2015). Again, since few beneficiaries ever leave the
rolls, the surge in disability recipient rates associated with
business cycle fluctuations or economic restructuring has
generally translated into a long-term increase in disability
recipiency rate in the working age population.
23 See Berkowitz and Burkhauser (1996) for more discussion of these
changes and their effects.
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Finally, there is evidence that the strictness of DI gate-
keepers also varies. Using SSA administrative records,
Maestas et al. (2013) estimate that 23 % of applicants are
initially accepted or denied based on whether they were as-
signed an easier or a stricter DDS gatekeeper rather than
on differences in the status of their health or impairment
status.
3.5 Why has the German experience been so different?
As seen in Fig. 1 and discussed above, recipiency rates in
Germany’s WDP program fell between 1984 and the re-
unification in 1989 and have almost continuously done so
since then. This pattern stands in contrast to the Nether-
lands, Sweden and the U.S. where recipiency rates have
increased considerable since the 1970s. While the rates in
the Netherlands and Sweden have come down from recent
peaks of 7.4 % in 2003 (Netherlands) and 9.6 % in 2005
(Sweden) they have reached a new record high of 4.2 %
in the U.S. in 2011. As a result, Germany now has the
lowest recipiency rates of government provided disability
insurance benefits among these four nations.
What accounts for the decline in Germany both in its
rates over time and relative to other countries? Our reading
of the data is that the relatively restrictive coverage and
eligibility conditions have shifted the costs of DI coverage,
especially since 2001, to individuals (and their employers).
This shift is evident in the fact that over 60 % of male and
40 % of female employees contract for private disability
insurance to augment their public insurance coverage. In
addition, WDP benefits, when available, have declined in
value over time. This reduction in the social safety net for
workers with disabilities has been cited as contributing to
the high poverty rates among public disability beneficiary
households fall below the poverty line (Krause et al. 2013).
Another more positive reason for the decline is that Ger-
many has been increasingly implemented one of the main
social insurance principles “Rehabilitation before Pension”
emphasizing the overall focus on maintaining work ability.
As a result, Germany has one of the largest medical rehabili-
tation markets. In 2011, 1.9 million rehabilitation therapies
were prescribed and a total of C8.9 billion are annually
spent (cf. Ziebarth, 2010b, 2014). This commitment to
rehabilitation while workers are receiving temporary earn-
ing replacement as part of their sickness benefits may have
played a role in curbing growth in the WDP program.
Finally, the German social insurance scheme is part of
a larger context of protections and expectations for worker
with disabilities. Germany has a coexisting Disability Clas-
sification System (DCS) which is codified in Social Code
Book IX (SGB IX) and entitled “Rehabilitation and Partic-
ipation of Handicapped Workers.”24 This DCS system iden-
tifies citizens with health impairments and assigns them a
handicap rating by medically-based impairment categories.
Only permanent health impairments lead to a classifica-
tion. For example, a mild form of Parkinson disease with-
out imbalance issues but “mild motion disorders” yields a
disability degree of 30–40 % whereas more severe forms
of Parkinson lead to degrees of 50 % and above (BMAS,
2009). A person with a rating of 50 % and above is officially
classified as “severely handicapped.”25 The SGB IX then
provides disadvantage compensations (Nachteilsausgleich)
for severely handicapped people such as: special income tax
deductions, the ability to retire two years earlier without de-
ductions, or parking lots for wheelchair users. Effectively,
all WDP beneficiaries are eligible for these benefits without
any loss of WDP benefits before retirement since WDP is
not means tested.26
In fact, almost one million people who are officially clas-
sified as severely handicapped work full time in Germany
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2014). This outcome may be
related, at least partly, to a quota system. It mandates em-
ployers with more than 19 full-time employees to employ at
least 5 % severely handicapped employees. Employers not
complying with the quota must pay a monthly penalty (Aus-
gleichsabgabe) of C290 per unoccupied workplace. This
effectively means that a small business with 20 full-time
employees has to hire one severely handicapped worker or
pay an annual penalty of $4500. Lalive et al. 2013, us-
ing data from Austria, which has a similar quota system,
show that it significantly increases the employment of hand-
icapped people.27
4 What can we take from these experiences?
For policy makers, discussions of reforming disability ben-
efit programs are accompanied by the knowledge that, even
when not generous, disability benefits are essential income
24 Before 2001, this was the Schwerbehindertengesetz.
25 People with handicap ratings from 30 to 50 % who have difficulty
finding a job can apply for the workplace quota system described be-
low.
26 Aarts et al. (1998) and Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2012) discuss
pathways from early retirement to full retirement in the German sys-
tem. Börsch-Supan and Jürges (2012) focus exclusively on Germany
and provide a detailed discussion of its pathways to retirement. Unlike
the WDP, Nachteilsausgleich offers those defined as severely handi-
capped a pathway to retirement two years earlier than non-handicapped
people without actuarial penalty. In the context of our three tier sys-
tem we view this option as a tier 1 benefit equal to the deductions that
are typically applied in case of early retirement, i. e. 7.2 % of the last
wage.
27 Unlike for other countries, there is a notable absence of research on
the German disability system and in particular the behavioral effects of
policy choices.
K
Protecting working-age people with disabilities: experiences of four industrialized nations 383
for many recipients. This is particularly true in the United
States, where other components of the social safety net are
weaker or less available. However, as the reform experi-
ences in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden demon-
strate, the dependence of workers with disabilities on cash
transfers is not an irreversible state. Indeed, the reforms
in these three countries point to considerable potential to
keep workers with disabilties employed, either eliminating
or delaying their movement onto the long-term disability
rolls. On balance, these reform outcomes suggest that pro-
work policies can both reduce disability recipiency rates
and increase employment among those with disabilities.
Another concern is that programs like disability insur-
ance are especially important in economic downturns where
individuals with limited work capacity are not only more
likely to be laid off but less likely to find a new job. Past
experience of EU countries, especially Germany and The
Netherlands, which intentionally or unintentionally used
this logic to turn their long-term disability programs into
more general unemployment programs, suggests that this
can be a very expensive and ultimately ineffective policy
decision. Indeed, many EU nations continue to struggle to
regain control over their disability systems which, for many
decades, have been used as long-term unemployment insur-
ance programs. A key message from the EU experience is
that explicitly divorcing long-term “unemployability” in-
surance from disability insurance is critical to effectively
targeting resources towards both populations.
Together the experiences of other nations suggest that
it is possible to balance the competing goals of providing
social insurance against adverse health shocks during work-
ing-age and maximizing the work effort of all working-age
adults with and without disabilities. Past disability policies
in both the United States and EU countries have focused
more on the former than the latter, resulting in rapid growth
in disability transfer populations that outpaced growth in the
economy. Efforts to shift to more pro-work policies over
the last decade in Europe suggest that fundamental disabil-
ity reforms, if done well, can lower projected long-term
costs for taxpayers, make the job of disability administra-
tors less difficult, and importantly, improve the short- and
long-run opportunities of people with disabilities.
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Appendix
Data description and sources
Table 3 Summary of DI Data Availability across Countries
Data Description
– Netherlands Sweden United States Germany
Initial Year 1970 1970 1970 1970
Final Year 2009 2009 2011 2011




15–65 16–64 16–64 15–65
Data sources
Germany Deutsche Rentenversicherung (2014) on ab-
solute number of WDP beneficiaries (“Renten wegen
verminderter Erwerbsfähigkeit insgesamt”). Statistik
der Deutschen Rentenversicherung (2014): “Rentenver-
sicherung in Zeitreihen 2014”, http://forschung.deutsche-
rentenversicherung.de, and upon request.
Statistisches Bundesamt (2014) on population between
15 and 65, unemployment rates, and people out of the labor
force. https://www-genesis.destatis.de.
Netherlands Historical population data are from Statis-
tics Netherlands. http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/home/
default.htm
Disability insurance caseloads data are from the Institute
of Employee Benefit Schemes, courtesy of Jan Maarten van
Sonsbeek.
Sweden Historical population estimates are from Statis-
tics Sweden. http://scb.se
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Disability Insurance prevalence data are from the Social
Insurance Agency yearbooks, courtesy of Lisa Laun and
Marten Palme.
United States Historical population estimates are from
the Census Bureau’s Annual Estimates of Resident Popula-
tion. http://www.census.gov
SSDI caseloads and covered workers data are from
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